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DEATH AND THE MORAL DOMAIN
DANIEL C. MAGUIRE

Death consciousness in our time is caught amid the forces of power ·
ful cross currents. On the one hand, especially on the American scene,
death, in the words of Robert Veatch, is treated like "an immoral
power to be driven from the community like the Salem witch."' The
enduring tragedy of Karen Quinlan has been from the beginning a
macabre symbolization of our society's discomfort with death and our
inabi1ty to comprehend the ancient appreciation of •the good deatli
(bene mori). The places where death is allowed to happen testify
further to our inability to accept death as a fact of life. In 1937, 37
percent of Americans died in institutions; in 1949 the figure was 49.5
percent, and by 1958, the figure had risen to 61 percent.• In a study
on New York City it was shown that in 1967, 73 percent of deaths
oocurred in hospitals and other institutions.' We are, then, culturally
in flight from death, even though two million Americans indulge in it
tJV«y year. And we also clearly deserving of British historian Arnold
Toynbee's taunt that, for us Americans, death is something of an unAmerican activity, an effront to our exuberant commitment to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
There is, however, a counter-force present in the culture. An almost
obsessive interest in death has emerged in recent years with all the
'Robert M. Veatch, Deatla, Dying and the BiologiciJl Revolution (New Haven
and London: Yale University Pres~. 1976), p. 5.
'U. S. Department of Health., Education, and Welfare, PublJc Health Service,
Epi.qxle!l and Duration of Hospitalization in the Last Year of Ufe United States1001 Vital and Health Stati~tics, series 22, no. 2 (Wash. D. C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1!)66 ), p. 3. Tbi~ study only goes up to 1958. No similar
fi-.,Jres of a later date an~ available.
·
'Monroe Lerner. "When, Why and Where People Die," in Thfl Dying Patient,
!'d. Orville G. Brim, Jr. ct al. (New York: Ru~~ell Sage Foundation, 1970),

P· 23.
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seriousness of a critical rite of passage. The denials and disguises of
death have not suddenly evanesced, but alongside of them and in
contradiction of them is a many-sided and newly obsessive concern
with the phenomenon of death. Professor Edwin Schneidman ew10
goes so far as to dub ours "the age of death." "In the Western world, ..
he writes, "we are probably more death-oriented today than we have
been since the days of the Black Plague in the 14th century.....
The cultural shift involved in all of this is highly significant tor
ethics. As we free, moral beings confront our mortality, we are forced
to consider the question of how our mortality relates to our freedom.
We alone among the animals know death to be our destiny. We alone
are animals endowed with the power of deliberation and choice. The
inevitable question, then, is how may our faculty of deliberate choice
enter into the dying process? Can the animal of deliberate choice have
death by choice? How much moral dominion do we have over death?
The answers to this cover a broad range: on the one hand there is the
view that we must do all that is in our power to forestall death, resisting it until we are overwhehned by its claims. Others feel that we
may refuse to start death-preventing treatments or desist from those
treatments once started when it becomes clear that we are no longer
serving life so much as prolonging the tortures of death. Others feel.
beyond this, (and I am among them) that there may even be extxeme
situations in which we may reasonably and morally enter into the
dying process as positive agents for death, chemically or otherwise
intervening to hasten the dying process. Whatever position is assumed
in this matter brings us into contact with the foundations of moral experience. The relationship of our moral freedom to death evokes
more foundational questions than any other issue in ethics.
Professors Hannon Smith and James Rachels and all other particf.
pants in this symposium will bring distinctive approaches, preoccupations, and answers to this subject. The unifying force of the common endeavor, however, will be found in the fact that as we treat of
death we are of necessity touching at the deepest wellsprings of the
mystery of moral existence. One's view of death will reflect onc·s
view of life. Moral responsibility in the face of death presses us to
show how we evaluate our freedom, our social nature, our worth a'>
persons, and our Cod. The current ethical concern with death is not
to be presumed a superficial fad. It is an opportunity for ethics to
•Edwin Schneidman, "The Enemy," Psychology Today 4, no. 3 (August 1970)

~p.37.

•
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probe its depths and to discover its own presuppositions. Even though
our debate will unfold here through the arguments of nonnative ethics,
it would be shallow of us not to be aware of the implications of what
we are about for foundational ethics.
In a study published in 1974, I defended the proposition that m
certain extreme cases it would be moral and should be legal to take
direct, positive action to induce death .." I would like to comment on
the changes in the ethical treatment of the issue that have appeare<l
in the literature since that time.
In addressing myself to this awesome thesis, I am not trying to say
that this is the most practically pressing discussion in the area of
death studies today. The times when direct acceleration of the dying
process would be indicated are likely to be few. From a practical
viewpoint, the most important developments in death studies today
are in the area of care for the dying and the bereaved, in the hospice
concept, and in the more effective methods for the management of
physical pain and depression. This is what can transform the approach to death in our society and this is where the principal energies of those engaged in the study of death should be directed.
The thesis that I am addressing, however, is the most fundamenta'
moral question in this area and the position one takes on it will be reSected in the other theoretically less taxing questions surrounding
human death. When we form a judgment on whether or not we are
ever free to accelerate the dying process, we have thereby taken a
stance on the definition of what death is for persons. All discussions
and all the literature on death and dying take place under the mantle
of certain assumptions on what death implies for persons. When a
person says that we are never morally free to end our lives directly,
he or she has assumed a specific conception of personhood and personal death that will have to be influential in other death-related issues. The question of mercy death, then, is not an exciting but optional
side-show. Clarity here is essential for clarity on the meaning of death
itself.

The state of the question in contemporary ethlc$ . . .
The subject of mercy death is getting treated more often, and more
ethicists are beginning to defend its licitness in certain circumstances.
Philosopher Marvin Kohl uses the term "beneficent euthanasia.. to
"Daniel C. Maguire, Death By Choice (Garden City, New York:
1974; paperback ffiition, New York: Shoclcen Booh, 1975 ).

Doubleday,
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describe a fonn of moral mercy death that is just:Uied as a mode (If
kindness. In his words, "the term active beneficent euthanculo is synonymous with the term mercy laUing-that is, both refer to the inducement of a relatively painless and quick death, the intention and
actual consequences of which are the kindest possible tTeotment of an
unfortunate individual in the actual circumstances."" It is Kobl"s view
that "in situations where there are no overriding rights or similar coosiderations voluntary active beneficent euthanasia . . . is a moral obJi.
gation."• Kohl argues that there is a case for beneficent euthanasia also
from grounds of justice since we have a right to live, a right to die,
and a right to die with dignity.'
Philosopher Richard Brandt has engaged this topic also. He loob
at the principle thou shalt not laU and wonders whether this is a basic
and prima facie principle and obligation. Brandt decides that what
is more basic is the obligation not to injure. He then goes on to suggest that not all killing is injurious. "H I come upon a cat that has
been mangled but not quite killed by several dogs and is writhing in
pain, and I pull myself together and put it out of its misery, I have
killed the cat but surely not infured it. I do not injure something by
relieving its pain. . . . If someone is being tortured and roasted to
death and I know he wishes nothing more than a merciful tenninatior.a
of life, I have not injured him if I shoot him. . . .... He thinlcs there
can be cases where this can be applied to mercy death. ••... in a situation in which it is rational for a person to choose termination of his
life, his eq1ressed wish is morally definitive and removes both the
obligation to sustain life and the obligation not to terminate.University of Victoria philosopher, Eike-Henner W. Iauge in hi•
book, The Practlce of Death, argues •that euthanasia is permissible In
several cases.- For eomple, Kluge says •euthanasia is permissible
in all those cases where an individual, in full awareness of what he
is about, asks to be killed or to be allowed to die because he finds life
"Marvin Kohl, '"Voluntary Beneficent Euthana.•la," In Beneficent Euthon&la, ed.
MalVin Kohl (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1975), p. 134.
'Ibid., p. 135.
'lind. For Kohl'• full argument. see Marvin Kohl, The Morallty of K~Umg
(New York: Humanities Press, and London: Peter Owen, 1974).
'lUchard Brudt, ..A Moral Prlnclple About Killing," In Marvin Kohl ed., op.
ca .• p. 109.
,.l&kl., P· 111.
"Eibl-Henner W. Xluge, The Practice of Dah (New Haven and London·
Yal<" Univr~lty Pres~. 19'715), p. 178.
·
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pbysfcally and/ or psychologically unbearable, and where no other act
would bring about an experiential alleviation of that state of affairs.
It would be a mistake to argue that acquiescence in such a request
would be giving in to a request for murder. The act would simply
DOt be one of murder."" Murder, argues Kluge, minimally involves an
infringement of rights. In the kind of euthanasia just described, he
aDeges that such is not the case. A right can be given up; a gift can
be renounced. "Therefore, in cases where the quality of life has
reached a certain subjective minimum, the individual has a right to
give up that life: to request euthanasia. Consequently, in such cas~
enthanasia would be morally acceptable.",.
A helpful though uneven study was produced by a Worldng P8lty
of the Church of England: On Dying Well: An Anglican Contribution
to the Debate on Euthanasia.... Two things should be noted about
this study. As a work of multiple authors, not all the authors agree
with all that is said, though all agreed to the conclusions in Chapter
1. The Report does have the authority of the Board for Social RelpODSibility of the Church of England and the chairman of that board,
Rooald Leicester, notes in the foreword that ..many will find in it a
fair reflection of informed Church of England opinion as it stands at
the present time."
Secondly, the study is dominated by the concern for the moral problem involved in permitting euthanasia "'by law... It begins with refereoce to the two Voluntary Euthanasia Bills presented to Parliament in
1936 and 1969 and its central concern throughout is whether voluntary euthanasia legislation is morally desirable. The conclusion of tbe
Report is negative on this.

'l1le •good and simple principle' that innocent human life is
sacred has influenced profoundly our conviction that the old
and the dying should be cared for and consoled, no matter
what their condition. It has been accepted by the Jaw and
by the profession of medioine. For our society to recognize
any departure from it, involving consequences that we cannot
predict and may not desire, wOuld require clear, cogent and

•oo.. P· 179.
•Ibfd.

"Printed in England by Ulthtbowns, Ltd., Ryde, I. W.; available at Church
Information OfBoe, Church House, Dean'• Yard, SWlP 3NZ. Authon of the
etudy were P. R. Baelz, R. M. Hare, M. A. H. Melmaky (CbalmWl), B. r
Mitchell, E. Garth Moore, C. Saunders.
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conclusive lusti6cation. For ourselves we do not think that
such exists.
It is important to note, however, that the Report is not saying that
a moral case for euthanasia may never be made. It says, rather, that
..It is often expedient to forbid by law acts which are thought morally
blameless. Such acts might include some cases of euthanasia, if although they were held to be morally permissible, the making of them
legal were likely to result in practice in the legalizing of other acts as
well which the law should be seeking to prevent..... The Report,
therefore, is not properly understood unless one attends to its distinction between the moral question of legalizing euthanasia and the
moral question of whether euthanasia is morally licit in certain exceptional cases. As to the latter question, the Report allows in its
unanimous conclusion that where the "best,. care of the dying is
not available, "exceptional cases could conceivably arise in which
deliberate killing would be morally justi.Ged as being in the
best interest of the person concerned..... Ethically speaking. thia
is no minor concession, and we shall note further examples of
this openness elsewhere in the Report. Notice here, though, that the
Report is positing a very large conditional assumption. If the but ot
standards prevailed, "better alternative means of alleviating distress
1i.e. better than euthanasia] would almost always be available....- ..
Even then, better means than euthanasia for alleviating distress would
not always be available! The point is that the Report does not assume
a position of absolutism with regard to euthanasia. Indeed it discourages such absolutism. Given the caution that always marks approved Church pronouncements and studies, this is no slight development, and I see it as a significant harbinger of a more h'beral direction
in the ethics of mercy death.
To get the full flavor of this report, some further aspects of it de·
serve comment. The Report argues that even if there are "'hard cases..
where euthanasia might be arguably moral, "it would be better to a)_
low hard cases to be taken care of by the various expedients that are
at present available.'... This is again a large and not adequately ar"lbhf .. p. 24.

..,biJ.

S('('

al"<~

p. 12.

"lbld .. p. 61.
'"lbid. ( ro1pha~l~ added) See also p. 18.
••rbld .. p. 10. Sre al~o p. 12.
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gued contention. It imports that if there are morally justifiable cases
of mercy death, it would be better to let them be handled outside the
Jaw. However, given the fact that care for the dying and medical
are not kept at ideal levels in England or anywhere el. .e,
there .is no way of saying that "hard cases" would be necessarily few
ia uumber. This leaves an indefinite number of cases unregulatt;cl
tmd open to abuse.
The analogy to killing in self-defense seems telling here. It would
be a "hard case" indeed when a private citizen would have no alternative but to kill in self-defense. Would anyone suggest, however,
tbat these cases be handled by vruious expedients outside the law on
tbe grounds that sanctioning any killing would lead to a domino effect
of undesirable consequences? I doubt it."'
Tbe Report allows further that "the prohibition against killing the
iDDocent does not hold entirely without exception.'.., Outside the
medical field, there are desperate situations where men have killed
others to avoid their hopeless and severe suffering. Thus soldiers
trapped in blazing gun-turrets rutd the wounded who face death by
torture if left on the battlefield have been shot by their comrades. The
Report says: "We have not found it possible to say that in these de.~
perate situations those who killed acted wrongly....• From this, the
Report moves on to the curious c.:onclusion: "Yet to declare that 'it is
not always wrong to kill the innocent; it is only generally wrong'
would be to deprive the principle of the sanctity which we feel it to
possess.- Without establishing parity (an impossible task, I submit)
the Report lumps any effort to end innocent life in a category with
activities such as torture, falsifying evidence, or discriminating on thP
basis of race." No matter how strong your case may appear, it is
better, in a view expre.'ised in the Report, not to admit any •violations"
of such principles in the form of an exception.
There are, of course, kind., of actions such as rape and torture which
may be treated as virtually exception-free. One would be forced to

J80Ul'Ce5

"'I concede that killin~ the ~ilty ag~ressor and killing the Innocent are very
dJstinguishable and that tht· latter has hem banned with special care. HOWf'Vt"''
it Is not acceptable to imply that the justifiable killin~ of the lnnON'nt and tlw
unjustifiable killing of the innocent relate in the samf" fa!lhlon to tht- ~pect for
innocent life ancl would precipitate thP ~arne f'fft'Ct•.
•Ibid., p. 11.
•Ibid., p. 10. Sef' also p. 18.
"Ibid .. p. 11.

•rbul.
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bizarre exercises of the imagination to conjure up instances when
they would be morally indicated in the absence of all possible alternatives. Mercy death, however, may not be gratuitously placed in
this class, as other statements even in this very Report should lead oae
to perceive. Furthermore, it is an error in ethical theory to speak o(
violating ones principles when one meets exceptions to them. Both
the principle and the legitimate exception to it are dictates of rigbt
reason and discerning love, and thus have equally sound credentials.
In its explicitly theological section, the Report argues that ..theft,
are strong grounds from the Christian point of view for hesitating long
before admitting any exception to the principle forbidding ki11ing
human beings.- This is a good point with which I am in full accord.
There should be no passion for euthanasia. Indeed we should wcwk
for the conditions which make it less and less indicated. To say this,
however, does not close the door to moral mercy killing any more than
favoring the conditions of peace makes one into an absolute paci&t
The Report recognizes this, observing that it is difficult •to maintain
either the moral position that euthanasia is always and absolutely for.
bidden, or the position that it is always permissible.- No one known
to me argues that euthanasia is "always permissible,.. but the report
does well to stress the difficulty of maintaining that euthanasia il always and absolutely forbidden. On the ethical impact of the e~
ceptional cases where euthanasia might be licit, the Report says:
Pemaps all that the unusual cases teach us is that it would
be unwise to make one's conclusions about the more common
cases depend on an absolute, not-to--be-questioned, moral prohibition of euthanasia. Such a position would be open to the
following rebuttal: since the case for euthanasia is at least
extremely plaUSt"ble in these unusual cases, a case against euthanasia which rested on an absolute prohibition would be
seriously weakened by what perhaps tlie majority of considerate people who took the words of Jesus in their natural
sense would say about the unusual cases."'

Wbtle granting that there are unusual cases where 1dlling the fnno.
cent appears justiftable, the Report says in this same section that •a
•rbfd., p. u.
•lbfd.• p. 23.
•Jbfd., p. 24.
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direct application of the teaching of Jesus to these cases would legitimize at least some instances of euthanasia....
Tbe Report is well-advised here to avoid the temptation of absolutilm. It is less well-advised in trying to draw Jesus into the flne
points of this debate. While allowing as I do that there are specifying themes to Christian moral existence which may often have inBuence at the practical level of decision-making", I believe we must all
resist the exegetically naive attempt to make "direct application of the
teaching Jesus" to intricate debates such as that on mercy death.
Before leaving this Report which I think deserves broad attention
in spite of the problems I find in it, I will cite two of its strongest
contributions.
The Report states that "It is entirely misleading to call decisions to
cease curative treatment 'negative euthanasia'; they are part of good
medidne and always have been..... The terms negative and passive
eutbsuuwia are not helpful. (Indeed I find any use of the term eutblnasia unfelicitous in view of its indefiniteness and linguistic varlabdlty.) The idea that a doctor who stops useless medications has entered the torrid zone of the euthanasia debate is a misconception. He
is DOt stopping treatment; he is moving to treatment that is more suitable, which may be simply palliative care. There is no death-dealing
here; there is only medicine in the form of appropriate care.
A second major strength of the Report is its concern with painmaDagement and its signaling of the high degree of success that Is
addevable today. It discusses the pain problems of 349 patients and
reports that all but seven of these patients obtained good relief from
their pain. Even of those seven, none had pain which was impouible
to suppress under all circumstances. (Most required diamorpbine to
control their pain. )
A caution should be entered here, however. Pain is not the totality
tA what may be unbearable suffering. Someone dying of Huntingtoo's disease may not have pain, but he has a unique sufering tlwt
many victims cannot bear and so are driven to death by choice. The
disease involves continuous, involuntary and unco6rdinated moveJDfJDb of the limbs and face along with a loss of articulation. and
•Ibid., p. 23.
IlSee Daniel C. Maguire, "Credal Conscience: A Qae1ticm of Moral Ortbodm.y,• Anglican Theologkol Rsofew Supplementary Series June, 19'76, ao. 6,
pp.31-5&.

•lbltl.,

p. 4.0.
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marked tendencies to moodiness, irascibility, and disorientation. The
final phase of this disease merits the term macabre. Tins illustrates
emphatically that pain-management and suffering-management are not
necessarily the same thing. There is also the subjective variable in
suffering. Some people may be said accurately, if somewhat cynically,
to "enjoy poor health." Some find the attention and care which illness brings to them rewarding. Others, because of different personality factors, may find even lesser indignities and discomforts unbearable. There is more here than diamorphine alone can address, and
much of the discussion about mercy death takes no note of this.
I have lingered on the Anglican study because it is a revealing piece
of evidence which shows the kinds of change that are occurring in
the ethics of mercy. It also provides an entree into the thought
of some other ethicists who are mixed in their reactions to mercy
death but who all reveal somewhat enigmatic approaches to this slowly
opening question.
Richard McCormick's reaction to the Anglican study is somewhat
special. He sees it as "a splendid piece of work." However, his treatment of it does imperfect justice to the tortured struggles of this work.
First of all, Richard McCormick's reaction to this study seems to
illustrate that McCormick has not yet finished his thinking in this area.
and that this may be the way with many ethicists. He is enthusiastic
about the Report, sparing it any criticism at all. In view of the problems of the Report (and my listing was not exhaustive), I flnd tbi11;
surprising. There are things there which I would think would, in
other contexts, have tempted his able pen.
He does note with apparent approval that the Report allows for ldlling the innocent life of the soldier in the blazing gun-turret. He then
says, however, that "the authors are reluctant to admit such exceptions
in the medical field" because "it is doubtful that there are any sucb
cases" and, even if there were, "it would be impossible to specify them
Precisely enough to prevent continuous and abusive expansion. . • ......
There are two problems with this: first, McCormick does not suftlciently take note of the Report's preoccupation with the moral problem
of legalization as distinguis'lwd from the moral problem of whether
individual cases of mercy death might be moral. He does acknowledge
that the authors do not want to foreclose the moral debate on mercy
~~ but by saying that the authors are reluctant to admit exceptions
( ~Richard McCormick, "Notes on Moral Theology," Theological Sfudle. 37
76), p. 98.

1
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in the medical field, he does not signal the openings allowed by the
study, and he does not comment at all on the authors· remarkable will~
ingness to let exceptional cases be handled outside the law by various
expedients. This approach to preter-legal expedients may be defensible, but it is certainly not a minor or self-evident assumption. I, in
fact, submit that it is wrong and ill-considered. There are other ways
of handling mercy death in society. There is, for example, the Uruguayan approach which is ignored in the Report. Uruguayan law, as
promulgated in 1933 reads: "The judges are authorized to forego pun~
isbment of a person whose previous life has been honorable where he
commits a homicide motivated by compassion, induced by repeated
requests of the victim.'.., This approach, which I would see as preferable, does not attempt to read into law a voluntary euthanasia bffi.
Instead it subjects each alleged instance of mercy death to judicial
review, as would be true in any case of homicide. The alleged mercy
death might in fact be murder. There are copious reasons why persons would be basely impelled to kill the sick. On the other hand, it
might be a case where mercy death was present and justifiable. The
judges can then forego punishment if it is clear that no crime ba~~t
been committed. This by-passes the problems of providing a law that
will foresee all circumstances and commends the facts of each case
to ·the living intellect" (in John Henry Newman·s phrase) of the
judges. In my contact with the Uruguayan embassy, I was assured
that the law has worked well and has not ushered in a "parade of
horrors.. such as the absolutists in the mercy death debate dolefully
foretell.•
"'Penal Code of Uruguay. art. 37 (Law No. 9155),
""McCormick's treatment of "A Plea for Beneficent Euthanasia" in the same
issue of the "Notes on Moral Theology" is inadequate. He limits himself to
commenting on a brief article by Paul Valadier. S.J. in Cahier~ July 1~? 5 ·
10
Valadier is concerned because the authors of the plea present eir
n
"comme seule humaine et eclairee." He does not argue a "!?ral casValordi~~
agalns_t euthanasia. The~e are problems with this. The "Plea is. as
a oed
calls 1t, a Mamfeste. It 1S not customary in this genre to gtve full or nuan
argumentation. Valadier want~ to know "au nom de quelle eth'tue les autfurs
parlent-ils?" McCormick could have served this interest by noting h at the ad
were philosophers Marvin Kohl and Paul Kurtz. He could also ,ave nor edited
the "Plea" did not appear without a scholarly context. Marvm Koh
i
Beneficent Euthanasia, a book to which I have referred above. ThiN volume ncludes articles by some of the signatories ( and others ) to discuss. both sides 0 ~
the debate. Articles of signatories and others were also publisbedT~ th~ 0of
The Humanist which presented the "Plea... Kohl•s own boOk.
M
Ialllng. reveals a great deal about the ethique of the plea. FocusinLon the
wording of the "Plea.. does not do justice to a serious effort to eXPlore t s issue.

P£
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Other interesting things are appearing in what might be called the
literature of uneasy transition regarding mercy death. We flnd .._
unusual twistings and turnings and methodological anomalies •
writers confront this awesome issue. In one article, for example. we
read: "If we have entered the dying process there are times that we
can actively intervene to help ourselves die:... The authors of dla
article are furthennore tmimpressed with the principal argumeat
brought against the moral allowance of any mercy death. I refw ID
the domino or wedge objection. ... . . indeed, we suspect that eudaa·
nasia could be pragmatically controlled if we wished to do
ODe
might fairly conclude from this that these authors, Stanley H..._wu
and Richard Bondi, are engaged in an ethical defense of mercy de.dt..
The central thesis of the article, however, is "that the notions
suicide and euthanasia are incompatible with and subversive
fundamental elements of the Christian story.... Among other thlap
in this article we Bnd: "As with suicide, we think that eutJnnd·
should be morally prohibited." "Suicide and euthanasia contribabt tn
the erosion of community ... ·suicide and euthanasia also u.ndermbae oat
notions of what it is to live bravely in the face of suffering; tbey taa~pt
us to take on a story that will pervert not only our manner of~
but of living: It is stated that living requires bravery.
il 8IDt.
however, the bravery of ending life but of continuing it.'The stated method of the article is to focus primary ooocena DOt oa
"'what should we do" but on the question "'what should we be.• n.
nottona of suicide and euthanasia "'fonn intentionality to haw ODe
ldnd of character rather than another.... The key question is to 1ac1
the story that forms the Christian community and relate the DOtiaM
of suicide and euthanasia to this story. ... . . our Job is to help the
communities we serve to keep their language pure-in other wants
the ethicist is more like a poet than anything else..,.
When it comes to saying why it is that euthanasia should be •_..
~ prohibited," Hauerwas and Bondi note that there are purely Pftl•

so.-

«
« ....

,t

"'Stanley Hauerwu and JUcbard Bondi, "Memory, Community and thP ~
Tbeolotdcal and Ethical RPIIection~ on Suicide and Euthanu-.•
~1."' tlae AfrWrbm Aaldemu of RPifglon 4 t, no. 3 ( SqltE"mber 1976\ pp.

for Uvin~:

·J'*l.• p. 449.
•JIM .• p. 440.

l

•.,.,_, pp. 4-49-451.
•rbld .• p. 4-tO.
•rbkl .• p. 442.

DANIEL C. MAGUIRE

209

....X: nucm.s for prohibiting it such as the weakness of prognosis, the
fCII"""lity of new cures, problems of consent, the legal problem of
ciiiiJapilhing euthanasia from murder, and the effects of euthanasta

• dae practice and ethos of medicine. They then state: "These prag..X: reuoos are important from the perspective of public p<>licy, but

cMr are

not morally why euthanasia is rightly thought to be prob-

Jeneetic'. • • ... They feel that these problems could be "pragmatically

cuatrolled."

The essential moral problem of euthanasia is stated thus:

Rather it is a matter of not killing ourselves, even if we are
In pain, as a way of affirming our continued contribution and
dlimation of the goodness and care of the community in
wiUch we exist. In other words, our unwillingness to kill
ourselves even under pain is an affirmation that the trust
that bas sustained us in health is also the trust that sustains
111 in illness and distress; that our existence is a gift ultimately bounded by a hope that gives us a way to go on;
that the full, present memory of our Christian story is a
IIOUI'Ce of strength and consolation for ourselves and our comanmity.•

Several difficulties present themselves here. First, the pragmatJc
pab1ems cited above are dismissed too facilely and are too blithely
problem.~
Me lerious and complex and should not be dismissed on the assump-

eammeoded to ..the perspective of public policy." These

tion that public policy can pragmatically control them. What is the

cMdeoce for this? Also, that which is a problem for public policy Is
allo a problem for ethics. The pragmatic is not preter-ethical for it is

wltbin the realm of pragma that moral value is realized.
Furthermore, it is not clear here whether we are dealing with

eMber a kind of essentialism or a species of consequentialism.

ls

euthanasia ex essentia subversive of the Christian community-fanning
story? At times, this seems to be what Hauerwas and Bondi are say·
mg. When they do grant that there are time!! in the dying process
when we might morally intervf'De in an active way "'to help ou~
die,.. they make this allowance in a context wht'Te they have just saul
that thert> are actions "that look very much like MlthannsiA.• Clearly.
this kind of active intervention would "'look very much like eutbanuia" to any passerby. Yet apparently. it would not be euthanuia
within the character and form of the Christian rommnnftv AI P"'.
•Jirid., p. «9.
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ceived and conceptualized by Hauerwas and Bondi. What would oae
call it? And if euthanasia-the real euthanasia-contradicts the Cbrbtian story, is this perceived intuitively? If not. the reasons must be
consequential; the effects of euthanasia (as a practice or as an actP)
are such as to undo the community and its story. This preserd:s fw,.
ther difficulties. Is this contention based on a prediction or on historical evidence? If on a prediction, it is liable to David Ben Gurioa•a
observation that no one is an expert on the furore. If it is based Oil
history. where would we go to find the evidence?
The article also contends that "Humans never kill more readily than
when we kill in the name of mercy."•• Again, one's hunger for e¥1dence io; stimulated There is impressive evidence that humaDS kill
much more readily in religious and ideological wars, and as I have
argued elsewhere, the motivation in mercy death does not enjoy the
intentional unicity found in other killing situations...
A final difficulty is found in the contention of the authors that they
are "examining the formal notions of suicide and euthanasia in relation to the stories which shape our communities.'.. Is there but oae
Christian story? And if so, does it (or do all of the Christian storiel)
yield a very specific precipitate such as the negation of a CbriJti.D
acceptance of some acts of euthanasia?
A similar approach is taken by Gilbert Meilaender who says tbat
within the world that the Christian story depicts •the action wbtcb
hastens death by means of an injection cannot be called ·care.· Not
because the physician is presumed to have any subjectively evil mo.
tive, but simply because in the world so understood this cannot be
part of the meaning of commitment to the well-being of the neighbor.
As an action in the world, it cannot reflect the shape of Gocfs actioa.._
Again, this conclusion represents a very precise yield from the purported nature of the Christian story. One must lcnow a great deal will.
great certitude about •the shape of God's action" to be in a posltba
to •y that a speclflc •action in the world.. could not ever reflect Coer's
pmpoiel. U the Christian story wer-e squeezed a bit more, could it.
perbapa, yield a whole code of ethics? The exegetical problems bent
are not aUght. and the presuppositions are enonnous .
.,Ibid., P· 449.

-see my v.th

l

B!J Chob.
-op. eft .• p. 441.
"Gilbert Mei!Mnder, 'lbe Dildnction Between Killing and Allowing to
TMologfotll s..6t 31 no. 3 (September 1978), p. 470.

Die.•

211

DANIEL C. MAGUIRE '

ID bfl opposition to mercy death, Arthur Dyok tries to get remarkably tpedfic substance out of the Good Samaritan parable. The Good
StaDaritan ideal, he says, "understands mercy in two ways: as a pledge
not to kill one's neighbor, and as a pledge to be the kind of person
wbo provides care for those who need it. There is nothing in the
stu:y that suggests that there is anyone who is beyond our care or

tblt ooe can claim that someone in need does not qualify for it. And
catainly there is nothing in the story that suggests that killing is a
form of mercy....
Among the many things that might be said to that, let us settle for
the fact that there is also nothing in the story of the Good Samaritan
that aays that it might be merciful to kill the soldier inextricably caught
iD tbe burning turret and begging the release of death. It is at least
perilous to try to get a detailed notion of mercy out of one or many
tedl in scripture which will warrant the specific ethical dictates of the
fGI't that Dyclc is defending.
Dyck also overloads and misuses the idea that •every life bas some
wartb,'" in opposing mercy death. Again, the soldi« in the turret is
DOt being ldlled because his life is judged worthless. Neither is this
the cue if someone in the final stages of Huntington's chorea wen
eued into death at his own request. The question is wheth« d«JJh
mlgbt assume significant worth in certain contexts. This does nol
.-a that life has become worthless in those cases. The worth ol that
life t. oo the contrary a motivating factor in the decision to bring oo
ct.th. Life is deemed to be worth too much to be foroed to go
tlarough such hopeless agony.
FIDally, Dyck continues to argue that killing is a wrw•~
c:banderistic of human action. This does not mean that
g ..
W"rODgo One might expect Dyck to reach this conclusion siDoe he 1&)'1
tbat •no human being or human community can pretWne to bow who
delenes to Uve or to die. From a religious perspective. 10me would
1eaw that kind of decision to God.- But no. Dyck Ja)'l that there Is
gooclldDing. "'For example, a penon's e&ort to prevent tomeODe'•
death may lead to the death of the attacker. However, we can
morally justify that act of intervention because it is an act of •viDg
a life, but not because it is an act of taking a Ufe. If It were limply
an act of taking a life, it would be wrong.-

an

•Artbur J. Dydc:, "The Good Samaritan Ideal and Bendlcent Euthanula: Con·
flicting View.! of Ml'rcy," UnGCnl ~ 41 ( 1975), p. 184.

"'Ibid., p. 187.
"lb4d., p. 188, note 9.
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Tills is a curious argument. For one thing, physical life is DOt a
supreme value, especially in a Christian perspective. There may be
many reasons to lay down one's life for the brother and the sister.
Furthermore, most wars are not justified by the claim that they saw
lives in a physical sense but because other values are thought to be
more important than continued living in an unfree or degrading <XJD...
clition, etc. Again, Dyck would be of little help to the man buroiag
to death in the gun turret. Helping him to die would not be life..
saving in Dyck's physical sense. Therefore it would be wrong. He
would also be of little help in discussing extreme cases that might
justify mercy death. He is logically boxed in by his lif~saving rubric.
Kenneth L. Vaux has written an interesting short piece on how socially acceptable mercy death is likely to become. Since the domiDo
or wedge argument is the one most often brought against men::y
death. Vaux's position is noteworthy. Vaux argues that "widespread
social acceptance of euthanasia will not occur because man is coosti·
tutionally unable to acquiesce in the face of death."• Vaux poiobt
to two causes of this. The first is biological and is rooted in out
phylogenetic resistence to death. "Although concerted agreement is
lacking. anthropologists from Levi-Strauss to Margaret Mead say that
if any human trait is universal, it is the fear of death and repulsion
against killing the fellow man. This impulse in man seems to inteosi.
fy in his evolutionary development and technological progress.- Tbc
spiritual root Vaux sees as even more telling. This root is found in
the long tradition of seeing death as an enemy and an offense. ""B"V
man came death into the creation. Death has a sting because it ls ~
payoff for his sin."*' Both of these factors are manifested in biomed{.
cine's unwillingness to accept death. Witnesses to this are found in
Western culture in "the medical commitment to preserve life and ~
social prohibition of euthanasia.""' The current willingness to dlscus.ot
and even to practice euthanasia seem to Vam: to be "a valid corrective
against the force of life-prolonging technological development..... n~
even predicts: -what will emerge from the present crisis is a wbol6.
some practice of elective death as a necessary corrective to the ex•
.. KennMh L. Vaux, '"The Social Acceptance of Euthana~ia: Pro,pecb and
J>rnhl.-rru."" in A Srpnponum on Euthana.ria, published by The Catholic Hoo. fta)
A••odatinn of Canada, 312 Daly Avenue, Ottawa, Canada KIN 6 G7. p. 13.p
..Ibtd.
·II~id., p. 14.
&>tbfcl .• p. 15.
"lbfJ., p. 16.
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ceuive intrusion of life-prolonging technology which prohibits death
&om having its appropriate place in our life.'..,
Vaux, however, is no naive optimist who would ply the thesis that
things are going to work out fine willy-nilly. A pendulum swing could
amsettle our faith in God and our understanding of life as trust. Public policy could become embroiled where it should not be. The unique
worth of the individual and the role of the physician could in certain
eventualities be adversely affected... All of these, of course, are dangers to be pondered not only in recognizing our greater moral freedom
iD the area of mercy death but in other uses of moral freedom in biomedicine. With this said, however, Vaux's position on the socially
imbedded counterforce which is likely to resist an overly facile acceptauce and spread of mercy death is a specific antidote to the unsubstantiated woe-saying of many who appeal simplistically to the
domino or wedge objection to support a negative moral absolute
apinst mercy death.
James Rachels caused a stir by challenging the traditional distinction between so-called active and passive euthanasia. Writing in The
New England Journal of Medicine, he argues that in many cases active
euthanasia may be more humane than letting die. If it is morally
right not to operate on a Downs child with intestinal obstruction, it
would be better to allocate death directly rather than allowing a slow
6nal agony. As he puts it: "It is the Down's syndrome, and not the
intestines, that is the issue.Rachels criticizes the idea that killing someone is necessarily mm
ally worse than letting die by setting up the cases of Smith and Jonc~.
Smith will get a large inheritance if his six-year old cousin dece~.
Smith goes into the bathroom while the child is bathing and drown.41
bim. Jones is in the same situation vis-a-vis his six-year old cousin.
He too plans to drown the child but ao; he enters the room he sees the
child slip, hit his head and fall face down in the water. Jones happily
ltands by while the child drowns. Says Rachels: ·u the difference
between killing and letting die were in itself a morally lmportml
matter, one should say that Jones' behavior was less reprehensible
than Smith's. But does one really want to say that? I think not.Rachels concludes that the bare difference between killing and lettiug
'''IIJUI.
"Ihfd., pp. 16-18.
•Jaml'!l Rachel~. '"Active and Pa."'liW Euthanula," Tlae NN E"f(lond Toumfll

of Medicine 292,
•rbkl .. p. 13.

no.

2 (January 9, 1975 ), p. 79.
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die does not, in itself, make a moral difference. Thus active eathanasia is no worse than passive euthanasia.
Rachels is correct in pointing out that letting die is uncriticaDy
thought of as per se morally less questionable. Part of this is due to
the simple i11usion that one is not responsible if one has done nothiDg.
Omissions, however may be an intensely deliberate and terribly elfec..
tive fonn of behavior. The woman who does not give the heart pllb
to her gasping husband because she would just as well be rid of him
is guilty of lethal behavior. Behavior may be active or passive. Letting die may be called passive behavior over against a positive ld ot
killing, but it is still potentially quite influential behavior of the 101t
for which we are responsible. It does not have any built-in man}
inununity, and indeed it has its own built-in intentional activity aad
concrete effectiveness.
Relative to the distinction between omission and commission wiUch
is Rachels' concern, I believe that the distinction is not a di.stfndioa
without a difference. Rachels is not directly arguing for euthan'lia.
HiJ main target is the false freighting of a distinction. Others Jib
Joseph Fletcher do make an explicit moral inference of the if-passivetherefore-active sort. Fletcher, for example, has said: -what, monlly.
is the diference between doing nothing to keep the patient alive aod
giving a fatal dose of a painkilling or other lethal drug? The inteotloo
is the same, either way. A decision not to keep a patient alive is u
morally deliberate as a decision to end a life.....
There is, of course, more to the reality of human acts than intention
and delibenteoess. Four ways may be cited by which omissioo act
commission really and morally may differ. First, they may cWrer 'tft
their effects. Psychologically the effects of having given a fatal dose
oE pain-1dller may be more disturbing to the bereaved than not tnating pneumonia and letting the pneumonia bring on death. On the
otb« band, it is also possible that the memory of a prolonged aad
terrible 8na1 agony might malce the survivors feel regretful that they
did not take some positive action to shorten the 6na1 torture.
In IOIWering his critics, James Rachels speaks to t.boee doctors wbo
aDege that terminal illnees need never be painful. He recaDs Stewart
Alsop's account ol the suffering of one of his fellow patients in tbe
solid-tumol' ward at the National Institutes of Health ... the most
to-date of medical contexts one would judge. The man was
injection to relieve pain every four hours, but the effects began to ...._,

given"':

I

tu

•JOioePh

Fletcher, "The Patent'• Right to Die," in Euthcancana and c4e
Euthonado, ed. A. Downing (London:
UMI&), P· fJ8,
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of In half that time. He would then begin to moan and whimper
IOfdy as though he were trying not to disturb his fellow patient. So

me pain would become too much and, in Alsop's

phrase, he began to

howl like a dog. Tilis cycle was repeated every four hours.• A
family who went through such a thing and later carne to see how unaecenary this cycle of torture was could be subject to the painful
elects of regret and remorse. There is no compelling and definitive
fti8IIXl why the relief could only be given every four hours even tf
IDOft

frequent doses accelerated the dying process.

There are other differences between omission and commission. They
. _ also at the societal level. Death by commission gives more con1101 to the one who dispenses death and this makes the actions more
abusable. This could be a social problem. This does not mean, however, that commission<~ are thereby uncontrollable, but it does show
thM, for better or for worse, omission and commission may be reali.stlcally distinguishable. In the name of clear thought and good ethics,
6tmctions must be made where there are differences.
Omission and commission may also differ in their deliberateness and
bathe amount of volitional commitment. Omission may result fruol
a ldnd of paralysis and inunobilization of the will as a result of get·
dug caught in the crunch of conflicting motives. Though both onUs·
8oa and conunission may involve inten<~e deliberateness, the volitiooal
ltructure is not the same. Jones. in Rachels' example, may have found
tMt he could not bring himself to drown his cousin if fate had not
intervened and made this action unnecessary.
Thirdly, in omission. agency may be more diftuse.. There may be
JDaDy who did not do what might have been done. 'MU.s will abo
afect the psychological structure of the behavioral choice, wblcb will,
ba bun, be relevant to one's moral appraisal
Finally, omission and commission diJier because each admits of a
rid1 variety of forms. In a true sense, no two omissions and no two
commissions are identical. Consider, for example the following dlllereaot omissions: not steering your rolling car away from a child ln tb
peth, not stopping to tackle an armed robber, not telepbontng for
help when one witnesses an ongoing attack as ln the cue of Kitty
Ceaovese, not giving insulin to an othenvise healthy diabetic, not giving insulin to a diabetic who is dying of cancer, etc. Sbniluly com
million admits of in8nite variation. and sensitive ethics wtD be alert
to these differences. Sensitive ethics also will not attflmpt to say that
·1~ Racht-1~ repl)". The NAJ F.nglond loulftlll of ~~~ 191, no. tft
( April 17, 197!S), p. 867. He h quotiniC Stewut .U.0,. -nte r1chf to dt.? With
dignity." Good Houtelc«p~ng, ( Aup~t. 1974 ), p. 130.
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if one admits to stopping ineffective treatments that one is thereby
logically compelled to approve of actively tenninating life. There is
more to ethics than logic. There is also the assessment of morally
meaningful empirical data. Among the other things we will note in
the empirical order is the real distinction between omission and commission.
Conclusion ...
The discussion of mercy death is having its belated due. More and
more authors are reaching the conclusion that mercy death in certain
circumstances is justifiable. This is not surprising since a taboo Is
crumbling and ethics has begun. An absolutist position on this subject no longer commends itself although some are struggling earnestly
to shore up the old taboo. The literature has more than its share of
contradictoriness and strained exegesis. Also many ethicists are attempting to approach the subject through the use of some single category such as trust, injury, kindness, rights, gift, justice, story, tK
through a fixation on the distinction between imposing dt>ath and letting it happen. The literature therefore offers a methodological tour.
My own view is that such single-rubric approaches, whether philo
sophically or theologically motivated, are ethically ill-fated. 0ne•s
treatment of any moral issue, but certainly of a humanly momentou.o:
issue like mercy death, cannot be tidily handled under the aegis of
any single category. What is needed. and what I attempted to do,
for example, in Death By Choice, is to set one's argument in the broed
context of one's complete ethical theory. One's faith posture should
also be visible if not always explicitated in the ethical treatment of this
issue. It should be discernible, for example, whether one ultimately
opts for a kind of theistic fatalism which would constrain further ecpansion of our moral dominion over dying in the name of God. or
whether one is more attuned, in Thomas Aquinas' choice phrase, to
the idea that we are nothing less than participators in divine PI'OVldenoe who have the prerogative and responsibility to discover the
good and choose it-even when the good in question is death.
The discussion of mercy death is to be welcomed for many good
reasons. First, it should enhance the contemporary renaissance i.n
death consciousness and help us define somewhat the radical meanin
of our mortality. Further, it should bring us to new insights into
actual nature of freedom and responsibility. Finally, the disCUssioo
should also be rellgiously invigorating, bringing us as it does into intimate and urgent converse with our meaning and destiny, and tbu
abo with our Cod.
s
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